Appendix A.1 Marginal abatement cost and permit price equivalence I first characterize the properties of how a hypothetical regulator could achieve a total level of emissions abatement over time across heterogeneous firms at least-cost. Because it would be impractical for any regulator to achieve this allocation, I then demonstrate how a capand-trade system with auctioned or freely allocated permits and unlimited banking and borrowing of permits can achieve the same allocation. In particular, the equilibrium permit price from the cap-and-trade system equals the marginal abatement cost of the least-cost solution to the regulator's problem.
Regulator's problem: joint-cost minimization
There are i = 1...N firms in sector j that, in the aggregate, must deplete a fixed known stock of R emissions over the period y ∈ [0, Y ]. 1 R is the aggregate emissions constraint, or cap. Consider an instantaneous profit function, π i (x ijy ), that is concave and strictly increasing in emissions with standard Inada conditions. The regulator's problem with choice variable x ijy and state variable b y is to maximize discounted total profit: 2 This setup differs from the Rubin (1996) model along two dimensions. First, the objective function is written in terms of firm profits and not the difference between unconstrained and constrained profits. Second, I write an equation of motion over depletion rather than accumulation. These choices were made for expository simplicity and are mathematically immaterial. ijy dy = R. That is, total emissions must equal the cap R by the end of the policy period.
Cap-and-trade
In practice, implementation of the joint-cost solution requires that the regulator know a lot of information. In particular, it needs to know the marginal abatement cost curves of every firm. Alternatively, the regulator can introduce a cap-and-trade system. Here, it's role is to create R cumulative permits such that in each period A ijy is given freely to firm i in sector j ∈ F and A a y is auctioned off.
3 Denote d ijy as the number of permits sold (>0) or purchased (<0). Under the cap-and-trade policy, the firm's dynamic problem is to choose 
where λ ijy is the positive current value shadow price. Defining the market equilibrium as
, and τ * y and further imposing market clearing and terminal conditions:
Rubin (1996) shows that the market equilibrium satisfying Equations A.5 -A.10 achieves X * * y = X * y and Λ y = τ * y for each period y. That is, the decentralized emissions trading solution yields the same least-cost emissions allocation as the joint cost problem and the marginal abatement cost obtained from the joint cost problem equals the equilibrium permit price under cap-and-trade. Next, consider specifically the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade policy, p = w. Optimal firm value can be written as:
where
A ijy (w)dy is the cumulative number of free permits granted to firm i over the lifetime of the policy. The second line follows by applying Hotelling's rule, τ y (w) = τ 0 (w)e δy and noting that the boundary conditions on banked emissions imply Y 0ḃ * ijy (w)dy = 0. Writing now in terms of firm value relative to expected firm value under all non-Waxman-Markey policies, we have: A.12) which is the trading date-invariant, structural version of Eq. 4 in the main text. In particular, the reduced-form RD parameter is:
Appendix A.2 Recovering the permit price
To see how the reduced-form RDD parameter β maps onto the first period permit price, τ o (w), consider the following estimated version of Eq. A.13: .20) Eq. 18 in the main text is the sample analog to Eq. A.20.
Appendix A.3 Deviations from the benchmark model

Restrictions to permit borrowing
The benchmark model allows unlimited permit banking and borrowing over time. While permit banking is unlimited in Waxman-Markey, there are restrictions on permit borrowing through the use of vintage-specific permits. In particular, a firm would incur a ρ = .08
annual borrowing cost for each future permit. While it is unclear whether this borrowing restriction would ever bind during the lifetime of the policy, one could assume that the borrowing restriction binds in every period to generate an upper bound on the recovered initial period permit price. Optimal borrowing implies equality in Eq. A.21.
In the general case with y ∈ [0, Y ] periods and vintages, the two equalities become τ vy = τ v0 e δy and τ 00 = τ v0 e ρv . The relationship between the price of a v vintaged permit when it is issued (i.e. y = v) and the initial period price of the initial vintaged permit is: .22) which, consistent with the prior literature on borrowing restrictions, rises over time below the interest rate (Rubin, 1996; Schennach, 2000) . The resulting expression for the reducedform parameter β becomes:
which for a given value of β implies a higher initial period permit price τ 00 (w).
Output-based permit allocation
The benchmark model assumes that permits are allocated in a lump-sum manner. In reality, the Waxman-Markey bill allocates free permits based on an output-based allocation rule. This section demonstrates how an output-based allocation may impact firm-level output in the short run as well as exit decisions in the long-run, both of which affects the recovered first period permit price. The rule states that the free permits received by firm i in sector j year y is:
6 I thank Steve Salant for this interpretation.
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A ijy (w) = q ijy X jy Q jy (A.24) where q ijy is output of firm i in year y and X jy and Q jy are total emissions and output in sector j such that X jy /Q jy is sector-level emissions intensity. 7 For simplicity, I maintain the benchmark assumption that sector j is perfectly competitive such that X jy /Q jy is exogenous to the firm. Under output-based allocation, the allocation of free permits is no longer exogenous to the firm as the firm faces an additional incentive to increase output.
This implies that all things equal, firms that receive free permits also have higher output levels than firms that do not receive free permits such that one can no longer attribute the RD parameter β entirely to the allocation of free permits.
To see how output based allocation affects firm decisions in the short and long run, consider the following instantaneous profit function: .25) where q() is an increasing, concave production function. z y is unit cost for a carbon intensive input that results in one ton of emission for each unit used for production. In the short run, an operating firm cannot exit the industry. Inserting Eqs. A.24 and A.25 into the optimization problem in Eq. A.4 yields the following modified version of Eq. A.5:
There are two implications of Eq. A.26, one for the cost of the policy overall and another for the distribution of optimal emissions across firms. First, because of the denominator in Eq. A.26, the marginal abatement cost under output-based allocation is higher than under lump-sum allocation at every emission level for a firm receiving free permits. And since marginal abatement costs must be equalized across firms in equilibrium, the permit price must also be higher, resulting in a higher overall cost of compliance. Second, Eq. A.26
together with the concavity of the profit function imply that all else equal, emissions, and hence output, of a firm receiving free permits is higher than that of a firm not receiving free permits during every period of the policy. This implies that the structural expression for the RD parameter β from Eq. A.13 becomes: .27) where the second term and third terms, which was previously zero under lump-sum permit allocation, now capture the difference in firm revenue and costs, respectively, for firms receiving free permits and those buying auctioned permits. The second term is positive and the third term is negative. However, the sum of these two terms is negative. This is because a firm that buys auctioned permits optimally emits at a level where marginal revenue, q (x * i,j∈A(w),y ), equals marginal cost, z y + τ y (w). By comparison, an otherwise similar firm facing output-based free permits would produce higher emissions with marginal revenue below marginal cost. Thus, the gain in the second term of Eq. A.27 is smaller than the loss in the third term, resulting in a downward biased estimate of β and a lower implied first period permit price. The magnitude of this bias depends on the concavity of the production function and expectations over future output and input prices.
The output based allocation under Waxman-Markey is conditional on ongoing operation.
In the long-run, this acts as an operating subsidy which distorts firm exit decisions by lowering long-run average costs, allowing a firm to operate longer than it would in the absence of free permits. To see this, suppose without the free permits, future input and output prices are such that a firm would exit the industry in period y =ȳ < Y or x * ijy = 0 for y >ȳ. If instead, the output-based allocation allows the firm to operate longer until y =ỹ >ȳ, Eq. A.13 becomes:
If output-based allocation allows a firm to operate over a longer period, profits during this extended period, captured by the fourth term in Eq. A.28, should be negative by definition.
Thus, the downward bias in β is reinforced by the presence of firm exits in the long run.
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Appendix B Potential consequences of a thinly traded prediction market
To understand how thin trading may effect estimates of β, I consider three possible sources of deviation between the observed change in prediction market price, ∆θ t and the true unobserved change in cap-and-trade probabilities, ∆q t :
where α 1 is additive bias, α 2 is multiplicative bias, and ω t ∼ (0, σ 2 ω ) is an error term which is uncorrelated with ∆q t as in the classical measurement error setup. I now consider the consequences of each term in isolation.
Additive bias Suppose only additive bias existed such that α 2 = 1 and ω t = 0. Eq. 5 in the main text becomes:
where the error term is now augmented by α 1 (β1{j = F } + η ij ). Observe that this extra term is absorbed by the inclusion of a firm fixed effect in Z it , which is present in all my regression models.
Multiplicative bias Suppose only multiplicative bias existed such that α 1 = 0 and ω t = 0. Then Eq. 5 in the main text becomes:
where now the estimated coefficient of interest is no longer an unbiased estimate of β.
Measurement error Suppose now only classical measurement existed such that α 1 = 0 and α 2 = 0. Eq. B.1 becomes ∆θ t = ∆q t + ω t . I consider the consequences of classical measurement error in prediction market prices when the mismeasured variable is interacted with a Bernoulli variable which is the treatment under my regression discontinuity design.
8
As a benchmark, consider the following true uninteracted model:
where jt is a mean zero error term. I make an additional standard assumption that cov(∆θ t , jt ) = 0. Using the mismeasured prediction market price ∆θ t instead of the 8 I am grateful to Doug Steigerwald for this particular formulation.
9 true probability ∆q t , produces in the limit an estimate plimβ uninteract = β o uninteract * bias uninteract where bias uninteract is the attenuation bias multiplier:
where σ 2 ∆q is the variance of ∆q t and S is the signal-to-noise ratio
Consider now the following interacted model which is a simplified version of my regression discontinuity specification in Eq. 7 in the main text:
make the additional assumption that the D j is independent of (∆q t , ω t ). If then one uses mismeasured prediction market price ∆θ t instead of the true probability ∆q t , the OLS estimate is plimβ interact = β o interact * bias interact where bias interact is the attenuation bias multiplier:
var(Dj ωt) . Considering each component ofS separately:
where the second line follows by independence between D j and ∆q t and the third line follows by applying the mean and variance of a Bernoulli random variable. Similarly:
where the second line follows by independence between D j and ω t and the third line follows by the earlier assumption that ω t ∼ (0, σ 2 ω ). Plugging Eqs. B.6 and B.7 into B.5 yields:
> 0, observe that bias uninteract > bias interact for any signal-to-noise ratio, S, such that my interacted regression discontinuity estimate will always be closer to the true estimate than if one were to directly estimate the effects of prediction market prices. That is, attenuation bias is always smaller in the interacted model. The degree in which attenuation bias is lessened depends on both the probability of treatment p and on the expected true change in policy probabilities, E[∆q t ].
Prior field and experimental evidence on the influence of thin trading Prior experimental and field research show that prediction market prices are relatively unaffected by thin trading or manipulation by individual traders. Intuitively, efforts to manipulate a prediction market by some should increase arbitrage opportunities for others such that distortions, if they do exist, is unlikely to last for long periods. Camerer (1998) places temporary bets designed to manipulate racetrack markets and concludes that successful long-term manipulation was unlikely even when considering efforts to distort relatively thinly traded markets. A similar conclusion is reached for both historical presidential betting markets (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004) and recent presidential prediction markets (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008) . In particular, Rhode and Strumpf (2008) Similarly, recent experimental work shows that price manipulators in prediction markets were unable to distort price accuracy (Robin, Oprea and Porter, 2006) nor influence the beliefs of third party observers (Hanson et al., 2011) . A notable exception is Rothschild and However, it is difficult to ascertain whether markets expected Waxman-Markey prospects to exist following the end of the 111th Congress. If so, this introduces a bias between the prediction market price and average market beliefs which would increase as the expiration date nears. To remove this bias, one would like to weight prediction price levels using a kernel that varies with the number of remaining trading days.
Formally, the true variable of interest is q t (T ) where T = 12/31/2011, the date in which the cap-and-trade system begins under the policy. I do not observe q t (T ). Instead, I observe a prediction market price for a contract expiring on date T 1 = 12/31/2010 < T . I now define this as θ t (d, T 1 ), where d = T 1 − t, the number of remaining days until expiration.
Specifically, it has the following piece-wise form: 
where d is a mean zero disturbance. The predicted kernel, k(d), is shown as the dashed line in Figure A .4. The threshold D is defined as the point at which k(d) = 1. To recover q t , I simply rewrite Equation C.1 to obtain: To extract all lobbying records related to climate policy prior to the Waxman-Markey bill, along key features such that the expected permit price for those bills was similar to that of Waxman-Markey (WM). In Table A .4, I compare the Waxman-Markey bill with the two most prominent Senate climate bills, the Kerry-Boxer (KB) and Kerry-Lieberman (KL) bills along four key features that may affect the equilibrium permit price: i) cap schedule, ii) sectoral coverage, iii) permit allocation rule, and iv) domestic and international offset provisions. Table A .4 shows that KB and KL had the same sectoral coverage and permit allocation rule as WM and only a slightly altered cap schedule. In particular KB required slightly greater abatement in 2020 while KL required slightly greater abatement in 2013. This difference implies that KB and KL may result in slightly higher permit prices.
The overall limit from domestic agriculture and international offsets was the same across the three bills. For domestic agricultural offsets, KB allowed five additional types of offsets offsets from 1 to 0.5 billion tons. However, both Senate bills increased the threshold under the "exceedance policy" whereby if the annual domestic offsets amount is below 0.9 (KB) or 1.5 (KL) billion tons, the regulator can increase international offsets by up to an addition 0.75 (KB) or 1 billion (KL) tons. Because of uncertainty regarding both domestic and international offset markets, it is unclear whether these differences had a major effect on the expected permit price.
Appendix G CGE models of cap-and-trade policy 31 Initial press release: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nbcc-study-finds-waxmanmarkey-reduces-gdp-by-350-billion-61941032.html Final report:
www.nationalbcc.org/images/ stories/documents/CRA_Waxman-Markey_Aug2008_Update_Final.pdf 32 Initial testimony: http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/the-economic-impact-of-thewaxman-markey-cap-and-trade-bill. shows a separate estimate of β from Eq. 7 in main text using expiration date adjusted prediction market prices (see Appendix C). Controls for normal market performance vary by panel. Functional forms for energy intensity vary by rows within a panel. Sample bandwidths around the 5% threshold vary across columns. All models include 109 2-day intervals from May 1, 2009 to July 31, 2010. Robust standard errors clustered at 6-digit NAICS level in parentheses. (5)). 90% confidence interval generated using 250 Monte Carlo draws from estimated parameter and variance-covariance matrix. Marginal abatement cost recovered using Eq. 18 in main text but assuming permit borrowing restriction binds during duration of policy (see Appendix A.3 for details). 5% interest rate assumed.
